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On Dewey’s Trail




1 Like any masterpiece,  Dewey’s Art as  Experience (LW.10) has been the object both of
relevant interpretations and of original and varied revivals, according to perspectives
that  are  each  time  specified  in  distinctive  manners.  This  clearly  established  Art  as
Experience as an important legacy for the field of contemporary aesthetics, and here I
will deal with one specific aspect of this wider legacy. In this paper I will suggest a way
in which it seems useful to draw from Dewey’s masterpiece while even going beyond
the horizon of a fully developed aesthetic theory. The aim is therefore to underline the
general  theoretical  scope  of  Dewey’s  specifically  aesthetic  perspective,  in  the
conviction that it is not limited to aesthetics in the strict disciplinary sense, but that it
has to do with philosophy in a general sense.
2 The unifying theme of this contribution will be the correlation between the problem of
meaning  and  the  description  of  the  aesthetic  in  the  framework  of  a  specifically
enactivist approach to the model of the extended mind. In order to introduce this issue
I will establish a brief comparison between Dewey and Quine, i.e., a philosopher who
certainly belongs to the analytic tradition. If one were to look exclusively at the way
analytic  philosophy  has  considered  Dewey’s  thought  in  the  field  of  aesthetics,  this
juxtaposition might appear no less than bizarre. In fact, one of the most prominent
traits of analytic aesthetics until the late 1970s was a silence toward pragmatism that
was broken only in very rare instances. Talking about the relationship between analytic
philosophers and pragmatists in aesthetics would mean talking about a relationship
that is indeed conflicting, at least as far as the decades in which analytic aesthetics has
defined its tenets are concerned (cf. Shusterman 2001). Yet, we are going to see how
starting with Quine (an analytic philosopher,  but,  significantly,  not an aesthetician)
helps to frame the question of meaning in its peculiar aesthetic characterization as
provided by Dewey. My thesis is that this characterization has a general theoretical
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import in that it makes it inappropriate to speak of “aesthetic meanings,” or even of
“meanings  of  the  aesthetic,”  and  it  instead  highlights  the  aesthetic  character  of
meaning as such, that is, how an experiential phenomenon can be meaningful insofar
as it is characterized in an aesthetic sense. Accordingly, we will speak here of “aesthetic
meaningfulness.”  To this  extent,  a  dialogue will  also  be  established with two more
recent  perspectives  openly  informed  by  Dewey’s  work:  Mark  Johnson  and  Shaun
Gallagher’s.
 
2. The Praxis of Meaning (Quine and Dewey)
3 It is well known that a decisive strategy in Dewey’s thought is the simultaneous double
dismissal  of  subjectivism  and  objectivism.  When  analytic  philosophy  has  embraced
similar metaphysical conceptions, it has often taken as its point of reference, rather
than pragmatism, post-Tractatus Wittgenstein’s thought. An exception, however, is at
least Quine, who clearly observed, “Dewey long preceded Wittgenstein in insisting that
there is no more to meaning than is to be found in the social use of linguistic forms”
(Quine 1981: 37). In itself, this recognition does not allow Quine to be listed among the
strictly Deweyan followers, even less so in aesthetics, despite the fact that he mentions
having attended the lecture series on which Art as Experience is based (cf. Quine 1969:
26-7).  What  prevents  this  inclusion  is  the  behaviorist  bias  that  burdens  Quine’s
conception of meaning and that becomes explicit when he states: “There is nothing in
linguistic  meaning,  then,  beyond  what  is  to  be  gleaned  from  overt  behavior  in
observable circumstances” (Quine 1987: 5). Generally reduced to behavior, for Quine
meaning is at the same time a cognitive acquisition. Indeed, in its elementary form it
would be “what a sentence shares with its translation,” where at the lowest degree the
translation “turns solely on correlations with non-verbal stimulation” (Quine 2013: 29).
What  looms  as  meaning  is  first  and  foremost  the  response  to  stimuli  that  can  be
identified as a nuclear content within behavior to the extent that it can be “translated”
into linguistic configurations.
4 The link between meaning and behavior can also be found in Dewey, but in a more
complex framework. Dewey, sharing the anti-mentalism that also inspires Quine, binds
meaning  to  the  interactive  nexus  with  the  environment,  but  also  with  what  is
objectively articulated in the course of an experience and therefore appears irreducible
to a stimulus or a set of stimuli. It is worth recalling the passage in Experience and Nature
in which Dewey reiterates the specificity of behavior of which meaning is a quality: 
Take speech as behavioristically as you will, including the elimination of all private
mental  states,  and  it  remains  true  that  it  is  markedly  distinguished  from  the
signaling acts of animals. Meaning is not indeed a psychic existence; it is primarily
a property of behavior, and secondarily a property of objects. But the behavior of
which  it  is  a  quality  is  a  distinctive  behavior;  cooperative,  in  that  response  to
another’s act involves contemporaneous response to a thing as entering into the
other’s behavior, and this upon both sides. (LW.1: 141)
5 One could also say that behavior hence does not constitute the cognitive foundation for
meaning,  but  is  an  embodied  accomplishment  of  it.  Rather  than  a  content  that  is
enucleated within behavior and becomes translatable, it is a mode of interaction that
expresses itself in “cooperative” or “collusive” behavior. As such, meaning is attributed
to what, as an object, looms up in experience but precisely because of how it is capable
of potentially enacting a correspondence in which those who agree on it  take part:
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“Originating as a concerted or combined method of using or enjoying things, [meaning]
indicates  a  possible  interaction,  not  a  thing  in  separate  singleness”  (LW.1:  148).  A
radical  feature  of  Dewey’s  work  is  the  withdrawal  of  meaning  from  the  stimulus-
response paradigm, which is replaced by an expressive nexus that has its own decisive
movement in the embodiment of aisthesis, of perceptual praxis. Meaning articulates a
qualitative  difference  in  the  correlation with  the  environment  that  acts  differently
from a factual stimulus. Against Quine’s cognitivist behaviorism, for Dewey meaning
exhibits an aesthetic-expressive root that prevents its reduction to the cognitive level,
exactly to the same extent in which it  prevents its  absorption within the linguistic
horizon alone.  It  cannot be translated,  but it  is  expressively liable to enactment.  It
consists of modalities of the sensible, of “sensa,” to which an analysis focused only on
the internal contents of feeling, on “sensations” or on mere inputs of any kind would
not do justice:
differences  in  qualities  (feelings)  of  acts  when  employed  as  indications  of  acts
performed  and  to  be  performed  and  as  signs  of  their  consequences,  mean
something. And they mean it directly; the meaning is had as their own character.
Feelings  make  sense;  as  immediate  meanings  of  events  and  objects,  they  are
sensations, or, more properly, sensa. (LW.1: 198)
6 This  does  not,  however,  undermine  the  basis  Quine  shares  with  Dewey  of  a
relationalism  that  refuses  any  philosophia  prima by  virtue  of  the  inclusiveness  that
subsists between world and mind, world and knowledge, and world and meaning (cf.
Quine 1969: 26). From here Quine elaborates his famous doctrine of referential opacity, in
which  he  broadens  to  extensionality the  inscrutable  nature  of  meaning  already
ascribed to intensionality. If in the theory of meaning often supported in the analytical
field the indeterminacy of intension is compensated by the determinacy of extension
(since “extension has been the firm thing,” while “intension the infirm”), in Quine’s
perspective  of  radical  translation the  indeterminacy  “cuts  across  extension  and
intension alike” so that “reference itself proves behaviorally inscrutable” (ibid.: 35).
7 This  confirms  the  weakness  of  the  thesis  of  the  absolute  incompatibility  between
pragmatist  and analytical  approaches.  Why,  then,  are the protagonists  of  analytical
aesthetics mostly adhering to this oppositional scheme? This scheme actually emerges
when  analytic  philosophy  and  aesthetics  fall  back  –  even  against  Quine  –  to  a
surreptitious  empiricist  matrix,  thus  relapsing  into  the  modern  dualist  gnoseology
against  which  Dewey  repeatedly  argues.  Those  who,  instead,  try  to  critically
emancipate  themselves  from  this  matrix,  follow  paths  intensely  trodden  by
pragmatists.  Thus,  insofar  as  the  doctrine  of  referential  opacity  is  connected  with
Quine’s commitment to stigmatize the dogmas of empiricism, it substantiates Quine’s
affinities with Dewey. 
8 A  specifically  aesthetic  difference  resurfaces  here  as  well,  however.  What  Quine
describes  as  something  radically  critical  for  meaning  is  for  Dewey  a  moment  that
fosters  a  wider  meaningfulness.  If  for  Quine  the  opacity  of  the  reference  signals
cognitive inscrutability, to be resolved by referring to the behavior of the speakers with
respect  to  stimulations,  in  Dewey  a  similar  observation  occurs  in  the  light  of  the
dismissal of the myth of analyticity.
9 Meaning is  pragmatistically grasped in the overall  process of  correspondence to an
experiential problematicity, so much so that it assumes an unavoidably instrumental
and at the same time performative connotation, which can be learned and revised as
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well as developed serially and metamorphically. It is located within “the gray area”
that  Quine  painstakingly  conquers  as  a  result  of  his  critique  of  the dogmas  of
empiricism. The poignancy of Dewey’s writing fully comes to the fore in the following
passage, when we read that “the meaning of a thing is the sense it makes” (LW.1: 144).
This  is  because the  term of  referentiality,  the  “object,”  turns  out  to  be  one of  the
vectors  that  are  internal  to  the  overall  experiential  field.  It  is  not,  cognitively,  a
stimulation; it is, aesthetically, one of the expressive “foci” that are embraced by the
field itself. The latter appears as meaningful, if – as Dewey points out – even merely
linguistic meaning “is something common between speaker, hearer and the thing to
which speech refers” (LW.1: 147). Consequently, the “object” is denied the role of extra-
semantic handle to which we can firmly hold on, so to speak. Hence the liberation from
the constraint of any ontological commitment.
10 From Dewey’s point of view, the extensional reference is the result of partial dynamics
within  a  wider  area  of  meaningfulness,  which  in  its  expressive  quality  eludes  any
absolute  determination  in  purely  epistemological  terms.  Thus,  no  scientistic  debt
(which instead persists in Quine) hinders the pragmatist project, which conceives the
relationship between human organism and environment in a pluralistic sense, making
the knowing subject an actor who carries out practices of interaction with the world as
ways  of  acting  within  the  expressive  field  that  embody  in  turn  this  latter’s  sense
potentialities. And it is precisely from this point of view that the aesthetically qualified
experience,  which  constitutes  the  specificity  of  Dewey’s  perspective,  becomes
exemplary.
 
3. Dewey: The Aesthetic Embodiment of Meaning
11 This semantic-expressive dynamic is described in Art as Experience as the embodiment
of meaning in an aesthetic device. Dewey’s assumption is the rejection of the scheme
according to which meaning would be an additional endowment to a content that per
se  is  acquired  in  a  neutral  manner.  For  this  reason,  the  notion  of  association  is
considered insufficient to explain the meaning of even a work of art, making Dewey’s
divergence from empiricism, both classical and analytical, even more accentuated. An
analysis that equates aesthetic meanings with processes of association risks, in fact, to
result  in  a  positive  psychology  unable  to  recognize  how  “the  suggesting  and  the
suggested may interpenetrate and form a unity in which present sense quality confers
vividness of realization while the material evoked supplies content and depth” (LW.10:
105).
12 Contrariwise, Dewey’s stance involves the restoration of the qualitative texture of the
real.  So it  is  not surprising that it  is  precisely in this aesthetic context that Dewey
makes a move that could be defined – in Quinean terms – as being against another
“dogma of empiricism,” by distancing himself from a hierarchical theory of properties.
In fact, Dewey observes:
As long as “meaning” is a matter of association and suggestion, it falls apart from
the qualities of the sensuous medium and form is disturbed. Sense qualities are the
carriers of meanings, not as vehicles carry goods but as a mother carries a baby
when the baby is part of her own organism. Works of art, like words, are literally
pregnant with meaning. Meanings […] are not added on by “association” but are
either, and equally,  the soul of which colors are the body or the body of which
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colors are the soul – according as we happen to be concerned with the picture. (LW.
10: 122-3)
13 In the foreground stands thus the relational dimension, which is neither subjective nor
objective  despite being imbued with both subjective  and objective  features.  Having
gained the centrality of this dimension, it is unavoidable for Dewey to abandon the idea
of experience as a mere linear sequence of responses to passively received stimuli. The
aesthetic device best exemplifies the resulting performative character that permeates
the entire experiential arc precisely because it is meaningful:
the meanings imaginatively summoned, assembled, and integrated are embodied in
material existence that here and now interacts with the self. The work of art is thus
a challenge to the performance of a like act of evocation and organization, through
imagination, on the part of the one who experiences it. It is not just a stimulus to
and means of an overt course of action. (LW.10: 278)
14 The perceptual act, as an articulation innervated by orientation and relevance, should
thus be distinguished from the neutral passivity of factual recognition, which is merely
scalar because it lacks the vectorial tension that informs instead the perceptual praxis.
And such a performative receptivity,  once distinguished from neutral passivity as a
“process  consisting of  a  series  of  responsive  acts  that  accumulate  toward objective
fulfillment,” acquires in itself the expressive function that serves to discern perception
from mere recognition (cf. LW.10: 58). Consequently, the realism that Dewey defends on
the level of the theory of perception is, however direct, not at all naïve. The qualitative
poignancy  of  the  holistic  and  synaesthetic  interaction  between  organism  and
environment is shown in the immediacy of perceptual experience. In it the fullness of
things as focal centers rather than the symptomatological virtuality of sense data – in
other words the experience of phenomena and not the empiricism of facts, sensa and
non sensations or,  again, the manifest dimension of correlation and not ontological
regions definable as internal or external ones:
angles perceived are the result not just of switches in the eye-movements but are
properties of books and boxes handled; curves are the arch of the sky, the dome of a
building; horizontal lines are seen as the spread of the ground, the edges of things
around us. This factor is so continually and so unfailingly involved in every use of
the eyes that the visually experienced qualities of lines cannot possibly be referred
to the action of the eyes alone. (LW.10: 106)
15 No longer functional with respect to recognition, and therefore no longer having an
ancillary role with respect to knowledge, perceiving is an intrinsically semantic and
expressive action, it is extraction and enactment of a meaningfulness or significance
(cf. LW.10: 60) immanently underlying the concrete and corporeal experiential reality.
These are potential nuclei that are expressed by an aesthetic device, insofar as “art
operates  by  selecting  those  potencies  in  things  by  which  an  experience  –  any
experience – has significance and value” (cf. LW.10: 189). Exemplary case is, more than
the denotativity of verbal language, the connotativity of music, whose meaningfulness
is in fact recognized by Dewey beyond the undecidable and sterile disputes between
formalism and conceptualism (LW.10: 241).
16 The  immanence  of  qualitativity,  in  addition  to  providing  the  justification  for
meaningfulness, renders the opposition between percept and concept futile. That is, it
opens up the possibility of establishing a fruitful and reciprocal connection between
the two relative orders, allowing for the explanation of how a description of factual
elements facilitates perceptual access to so-called aesthetic properties.  And such an
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incorporation of the meaning into the work has no set limits per se (LW.10: 35-6). For,
in this way, the equation of meaning with something that is stipulated in a merely
cognitive or even epistemological way has completely been set aside. And this allows us
to acknowledge the truly aesthetic import of meaningfulness, which indeed subsists
only in its becoming concrete, and thus within the perimeter of aisthesis while being the
punctuation of its rhythm and relevance. On this basis Dewey (LW.10: 313) examines,
finally,  the  processes  of  attribution  of  aesthetic  properties,  attaining,  beyond  any
empiricist misunderstanding, various elements then widely reconsidered in the course
of the analytical debate. 
17 The pregnant fusion of  artwork and meaning,  and more generally of  consummated
experience (i.e. “aesthetic” in Dewey’s sense) and meaningfulness, embodies the very
character  of  the  interactive  threshold  of  a  “natural”  reality  preceding  modernity’s
dualisms.  This  is  why  the  retrieval  of  corporeality  as  a  concrete  form  of  mental
functions  becomes essential,  before  any hypostatization of  corporeal  matter  and of
mind. Holism and synesthesia, but also the interweaving of concept and percept, are
the coordinates within which Dewey’s analysis is profiled as a study of the aesthetic
roots of the “mind” as that “body of organized meanings by means of which events of
the present have significance for us” (cf. LW.10: 277; italics added). The effects of a double
collapse can be observed here. Both the collapse of the gnoseological object (ideal and
independent) and that of the gnoseological subject (hypothetical source of the semantic
connotation  of  the  world).  In  this  region,  prior  to  definite  ontological
characterizations, that is, characterizations of particular entities, one encounters the
dynamics  in  which  reality  each  time  is  configured  in  particular  ways.  A  relevant
aesthetic implication of this approach is that the interactive threshold of experience, in
which  corporeality  becomes  crucial,  opens  up  the  dimension  of  the  modalities  of
semblance. Ontological issues lose their importance and are replaced by a description
of phenomenal modalities and manifestations. 
18 From this point of view, the fundamental assumption of the whole research presented
in Art as Experience is definitely significant. It concerns the distinction between artwork
(as  field  of  experience)  and art  object  (as  objective  hypostasis)  on the  basis  of  the
recognition of the attributive and not substantive dimension of art. As we can read in a
rare passage in which Dewey almost seems to provide a definition: “Art is a quality of
doing and of what is done. Only outwardly, then, can it be designated by a substantive
noun. Since it adheres to the manner and content of doing, it is adjectival in nature”
(LW.10: 218).
 
4. The Aesthetics of Meaning and the Multi-
dimensionality of Experience (a dialogue with Mark
Johnson)
19 Based on these assumptions, Mark Johnson (2018) has carried out a thorough analysis
of  the  perspective  of  an  aesthetics  of  meaning  compatible  with  an  embodied  and
extended conception of the mind.1 Johnson’s starting point is a stance toward aesthetic
experience that is well summarized by the following quotations:
Aesthetics  is  not  merely  a  matter  of  constructing  theories  of  something  called
aesthetic experience, but instead extends broadly to encompass all the processes by
which  we  enact  meaning  through  perception,  bodily  movement,  feeling,  and
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imagination. In other words, all meaningful experience is aesthetic experience. (Johnson
2018: 2)
Aesthetics has been conceived far too narrowly as concerned with something called
“aesthetic  experience,”  which  is  then  distinguished  from  other  modes  of
experience and thought (e.g., theoretical, technical, and moral) that make up the
fabric of our daily lives. (Ibid.: 225)
Any  adequate  theory  of  meaning  will  have  to  focus  on  those  qualitative  and
affective dimensions of experience that have usually been regarded as operative
mostly in our experience, appreciation, and creation of various arts, but are now
recognized as lying at the heart of all our meaning-making. (Ibid.: 51)
20 Yet, following Dewey in redeeming the aesthetic from its segregation, to the extent of
highlighting the interweaving between the aesthetic and meaning, perhaps does not
mean denying the possibility, and even the opportunity, that it still  makes sense to
speak  of  aesthetic  experience  as  distinct,  in  some dimension (without  reference  to
types or kinds), from something else that is, although not aesthetic, yet still experience.
I do not believe, indeed, that it is legitimate to argue that every experience as such
should be characterized as aesthetic. And I think that this can be supported precisely
by remaining faithful to Dewey. 
21 On the one hand, it is true that in Dewey’s perspective the aesthetic is transversal. It
cannot be segregated into a cultural sphere such as that of the Fine Arts.  Precisely
because  it  embodies  meanings,  it  eludes  those  who  question  the  “meaning  of  the
aesthetic” in order to succeed in the task of identifying a special field of exceptional
meanings, perhaps endowed with their own peculiar logic. On the other hand, however,
this does not imply that every experience insofar as it relates to a meaning is therefore
aesthetically  connoted.  With Dewey,  if  it  is  right to deny the existence of  different
types  or  kinds of  experience,  it  seems  wrong  not  to  recognize  the  opportunity  of
describing  experience  according  to  different  dimensions.  In  the  same  way,  it  is  by
knowing  the  side  of  a  square  that  we  can  determine  both  its  surface  area  and  its
perimeter without either reducing one thing to the other or defining different types or
kinds to which the square would belong or, even less so, different ontological regions to
which  it  would  pertain.  Accordingly,  if  one  should  no  longer  speak  of  “aesthetic
meanings”  (as  logical  phenomena  sui  generis)  one  can  still  identify  an  “aesthetic
meaningfulness”  as  a  primitive modality,  or  dimension,  of  experience that  is  tacitly
operating  throughout  experience  (and  capable  of  becoming  intensely  manifest,
“perspicuous and conspicuous” in some circumstances; cf. Iannilli 2020: 74 and 134),
but  not,  however,  connoting  or  foundational  with  respect to  other  modalities  or
dimensions of experience.
22 From experience in general Dewey distinguishes what he calls “an” experience, i.e., the
experience whose peculiar character becomes a prominent aesthetic dimension (see
LW.10: 42 ff.).  In other terms, according to Dewey not all experience is aesthetic, so
much so that the spectrum of the dimensions of experience that Dewey illustrates, for
instance,  in  Experience  and  Nature certainly  cannot  be  reduced  to  the  aesthetic.
Aesthetic is (only) “an” experience, or rather: experience when it is “an” experience,
and not “the” experience. We could say that the latter is mere experience-of something
(when,  for  instance,  a  subject  faces  an  opposed  object  for  exclusively  cognitive
purposes);  it  is  the  generic  interaction between organism and environment.  And it
reveals its inhering in the aesthetic dimension (only) when it appears as an aspect of a
field relationship that is specific (or specifically pregnant) because the terms between
which  it  is  established  are  strongly  corresponding  to  each  other  and  primitively
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included in this correspondence. When I’m simply feeding myself, my experience is of
the  food;  I  face  the  food  as  a  means  to  my  nutrition.  But  when  I’m  having  “an”
experience such as a great meal in Paris, what counts is the experience I have with the
food that is served to me, with the company I’m having dinner with, etc. Here the terms
involved, “colluded,” are not opposed; they are not considered as facing each other, but
as taking part in the course of the same interaction from which they emerge. Speaking
of that meal in Paris as “an” experience, means that it is only within this experience
that  both  I  and  the  food  are  “defined”  for  what  we  “truly”  are,  that  is,  for  the
meaningfulness we will have also when we remember or tell someone about that meal.
This  shows  how  each  experience-of is  a  (potentially)  partial  manifestation  of  “an”
experience-with (cf. Matteucci  2018).  It  is  thus  still  possible  to  discern between non-
aesthetic  experience and aesthetic  experience,  although not in terms of  ontological
regions but in terms of phenomenological dimensions.
23 This has directly to do with the relationship between experience and meaning, which
similarly does not allow for a 0-1, off-on juxtaposition in Dewey’s theory. We could use
also  here  the  same  scheme  that  emerged  previously.  According  to  the  aesthetic
dimension, expression is performatively experience with meaning. When, on the other
hand, this dimension is not pregnant, the relationship to meaning does not fade away
but  becomes  that  of  the  experience  of it  or,  as  Dewey  says  (LW.10:  92  ff.),  that  of
statement.
24 In other words:
-  in  expression,  meaning  is  experience,  it  consists  in  its  very  unfolding,  in  its
articulation  for  how  it  is  structured  and  configured  in  its  peculiarity  (as  “an”
experience with the meaning that is engaging us);
- in statement, meaning is (not absent, but) terminus ad quem to which the sign of the
assertion points, as experience to which it simply refers (in the ongoing progress of
“the” experience of the meanings we face).
25 Expression  as  an  experience  with the  meaning  is  the  way  how  organisms  feel
themselves invited to take part in a certain interaction field thanks to the material
qualities  provided  by  a  medium  (in  the  “material  collusion”  that  the  aesthetic
engagement defined by Johnson in several pages as “visceral” consists of). Therefore, it
marks off the aesthetic dimension of experience as something meaningful. And given
this collusive-expressive character of the whole field involving the organism with its
environment, a sort of aesthetic justification for the conception of the “extended mind”
surfaces, making the latter irreducible to the cognitive (as instead is the case in the
discussion of the extended mind model in relation to aesthetics recently carried out by
Nannicelli 2019). 
 
5. Aspects of the Aesthetic Meaningfulness for an 
Extended Conception of the Mind 
26 When we speak of an extended mind, the idea that a mind which is intracranial – or
even  intra-corporeal  –  first  and  only  then  “gets  extended”  outward  in  order  to
progressively include portions of the world extraneous to the self is misleading. Once
again we could use Dewey to underline how the extended mind coincides with the very
organism-environment interaction in its various modalities. In this sense I would say
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that extended mind means first of all experience-with: it cannot be conceived not only
beyond  embodiment,  but  also  regardless  of  its  aesthetic  connotation,  i.e.,  its
intrinsically immersive nature, where however the body in which it is embodied is not
a subject, but a vector of the field itself. To speak of an extended mind on Dewey’s trail
therefore means at the same time to speak of an oxymoronically impersonal (not yet
felt  as  personal)  lived-living  body.  It  is  the  active  threshold  of  a  perceiving  that
becomes feeling and vice versa, thus generating meaningfulness. And on this osmotic
border something like a  Self  (a  tendency towards the first  person perspective)  and
something like a world (a tendency towards objectivity) emerge. Understood otherwise,
for instance, starting from the body in the first person, the idea of embodiment would
only replicate, with respect to the body, the same dualistic patterns of the modern and
Cartesian  mind,  with  the  further  drawback  of  being  less  armed  against  a  brutal
reductionism (moving from a mind meant as an interaction to a mind meant as a mere
neurological system).
27 This seems partly to take place precisely in Johnson’s research. It is true that he notes
that  “meaning  arises  in  the  processes  of  organism-environment  interaction  that
mutually define ourselves and our world” (Johnson 2018: 14), or also that “subjectivity
and objectivity are thus two aspects of one and the same experiential process” (ibid.:
204). However, in the description that he offers of this mutuality, the radical mediation
that should precede the reality of a Self and of a world is instead expressed beginning
from a Self (with its acquired contents, either perceptually or imaginatively, that is,
with  respect  to  a  past  currently  deemed  reactivable  or  with  respect  to  a  future
currently  deemed  predictable)  and  a  world  (with  its  objective  properties  given  as
affordances).
28 This  is  also  confirmed  by  Johnson’s  non-critical  reference  to  Barsalou  and  his
“simulation semantics” theory (see also Johnson 2018: 246). It is no coincidence that
this account of nuclei of perceptual meaning is carried out according to the principle of
“simulation,”  as  if  –  empiristically  –  the  “real”  perception  were  another  matter
entirely. 
29 This could be countered with a more markedly phenomenological interpretation of the
above  mentioned  radical  mediation.  The  experiential  content,  especially  on  the
perceptual  and  aesthetic  level,  is  anything  but  simulated:  it  appears  in  its  full
meaningfulness.  When we read a poem, we do not simulate events.  Properly,  these
events “enter the scene,” as Johnson suggests when he states: “That felt qualitative
unity is not re-presented by the poem; rather, it is enacted in and realized through the
continuous process of the unfolding of the poem” (ibid.:  17). The term “simulation,”
with the  halo  of  denigration of  appearance  it  bears,  does  not  seem to  me entirely
compatible with this performative enactment which consists in the entering into the
scene  of  an  experiential  arc  which  even  the  organism  that  participates  personally
experiences with. A simulation can always be falsifying and fictitious and therefore it is
intrinsically  amendable.  Instead,  the  overall  aesthetic  content  of  an  experience  is
never, as such, amendable (at most, with the same vectors involved in an experiential
arc one can always have a new experience, and not amend the previous one).
30 The question can also  be  addressed  with  respect  to  ordinary  experience.  As  far  as
Johnson’s observations on the “meaning of a bowl” (ibid.:  244-5) are concerned, the
thesis that it “is not just some abstract concept specifying a defining set of features that
jointly constitute it as a bowl” is certainly to be supported. What I find problematic,
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however, is his further description, that seems to place the meaning exceeding any
abstract definition in the set of perceptual or imaginative experiences that have been
acquired previously  with  respect  to  the  object  (see  also  ibid.:  210  and 244 ff.).  This
description can at most corroborate a regressive analysis of meaning, which however
does not explain either its emergence or the capacity of the generation of a “new”
meaning as an articulation of its operative meaningfulness, which by definition is such
because it manifests itself without any previous acquisition.
31 The point is that everything we are willing to call a “bowl” shares not objective traits or
personal lived experiences, but the fact that it populates a field in which the experience
with something unfolds itself in the same meaningful way (the way in which materials,
even liquid ones,  are contained and made transportable,  for instance:  a “bowl-lish”
field, so to speak, which requires those who act personally to manage it accordingly,
i.e., responding to the expressive appeal they feel drawn by), regardless of whatever we
experience (whether it be artifacts made of ceramic or other materials, or even our
own bowl-shaped hands). In short, the aesthetic is, prior to being the experience of the
possible (see ibid.: 248), an experience with possibility, that is, it embodies meaning as
that which is possible in the praxis and not as a target that is aimed at. It is a matter –
like Dewey says – of “possibilities that are felt as a possession of what is now and here”
(LW.10:  24),  because  the  aesthetic  is  able  to  give  “particularity  of  existence  to  the
generality of  potentiality” (LW.10:  247),  to make “the what” “a how,” to shift  from
meaning to meaningfulness. A true aesthetic meaningfulness so emerges, which is at
the same time transversal and not generic with respect to experience.
32 And it is to this “how” that the various perceptual or imaginative acquisitions also hold
on in the course of our lives. It constitutes the radically extra-linguistic component of
meaning. Indeed, the “how” is what language stages with words, and which thus always
exceeds the propositional order of the latter, as much as any other given set of signs.
And in order to capture this “how” one must rather insist on the relational dimension
of  experience  outside  of  any  ontological  hypothesis  about  what  is  an  experience,
whatever  side  (subjective  or  objective)  one  wants  to  consider.  Here  the  legacy  of
Dewey’s aesthetic reflection proves to be decisive. Not least because it turns out to be
compatible with attempts to define non-Cartesian models of the mind, which therefore
could draw a significant advantage from “hiking” precisely on Dewey’s trail starting
from his analysis of what is called here aesthetic meaningfulness.
 
6. An Aesthetic Characterizazion of Gallagher’s 
Enactivist Approach to the Extended Mind
33 The understanding of the mind as a field of aesthetic meaningfulness owes much to
Gallagher’s proposal to specify the model of the extended mind in an enactivist key by
retrieving pragmatism, in order to avoid aporias which are instead unavoidable in a
functionalist  key (Gallagher 2017:  48-64).  This  strategy involves the retrieval  of  the
notion  of  “situation”  drawn from Dewey,  which  Gallagher  presents  very  clearly  as
follows:
the  situation  is  not  equivalent  to  the  environment.  That  is,  it  is  not  that  the
organism is placed in a situation. Rather the situation is constituted by organism-
environment,  which  means  that  the  situation  already  includes  the  agent  or
experiencing subject. In this regard, for example, if I am in a problematic situation,
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I cannot strictly point to the situation because my pointing is part of the situation. I
cannot speak of it as some kind of objective set of factors because my speaking is
part of it. My movement is a movement of the situation. Accordingly, the trick to
solving  a  problematic  situation  is  not  simply  to  rearrange  objects  in  the
environment, but to rearrange oneself as well – to make adjustments to one’s own
behaviors. Indeed, any adjustment one makes to objects, artifacts, tools, practices,
social relations, or institutions is equally an adjustment of oneself. (Ibid.: 55-6)
34 Shortly afterwards Gallagher adds:
As extended and enactive, the mind is situated in the way that Dewey defines this
notion.  The  situation  includes  not  just  our  notebooks,  computers,  and  other
cognitive  technologies,  and  not  just  the  social  and  cultural  practices  and
institutions that help us solve a variety of cognitive problems, it also includes us.
We are in the world in a way that is not reducible to occupying an objective position
in  the  geography  of  surrounding  space,  and  in  a  way  such  that  the  world  is
irreducible to an abstraction of itself  represented in one’s brain. We, as minded
beings,  are  definitively  “out  there,”  dynamically  coupled  to  artifacts,  tools,
technologies, social practices, and institutions that extend our cognitive processes
(Ibid.: 59-60)
35 Now,  if  it  is  true  –  as  Gallagher  (ibid.:  58)  observes  –  that  “in  many regards  much
depends on how we understand the coupling relation between organism-environment,”
I believe that characterizing this relation in an aesthetic sense as meaningful is the
most useful strategy to avoid functionalist representationalism. “Situation,” indeed, is
tantamount  to  what  I  have  often  called  “field,”  to  which  we  should  attribute  the
ownership of  the processes that  take place in it.  A situation does not  depend on a
foundation that  is  either  subjective or  objective and that  would already presume a
context  within  which  the  cognitive  thematization  takes  place.  In  the  field  of
experience-with,  that is,  of  the aesthetic  as described by Dewey,  subject  and object
emerge by virtue of a correspondence that dynamically shapes each of its vectors, and
therefore the two potential poles towards which it extends, through the ways of acting
and operating of the vectors themselves, according to the basic principle of enactivism.
And  only  this  aesthetic  primitiveness  explains  its  potential  criticality.  A  situation
manifests itself as problematic, in the appearance that is carried out in it, according to a
coupling that coincides with living in a network of plastic references that reveal the
aspects of  the dynamic field that is  being inhabited.  In its  appearing under certain
aspects,  the  situation  is  an  expressive  correspondence  that  underlies  an  extended
mind.
36 Thus, the environment also manifests itself as an aspect of the situation, as a nature
that becomes human. It operates as a relational vector and not as an entity looming
over a subject. On the other hand, when the organism plays along with the situation, it
finds  itself  established  for  how  it  manipulates  expressive  devices,  according  to  a
material collusion where (the practices with) the objects are what shapes the so-called
subjects more than the other way around. Therefore each situation is more than merely
biological.  It  implies  a  configurative artificiality;  an expressiveness  that,  as  such,  is
already cultural and social.
37 This  also  helps  us  highlight  the  enactive  performance  that  occurs  in  aesthetic
experience  as  a  meaningful  articulation.  What  one  aims  to  get  from  an  aesthetic
experience as such is not the acquisition once and for all of the (knowledge of a) given.
The overall content of the aesthetic experience is its own carrying itself out. Therefore,
what captures us aesthetically never ceases to fascinate us and induces us to reiterate
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experiences, in some cases even obsessively. The source of gratification is the way in
which  the  collusion  is  realized  each  time,  not  the  outcome  to  which  it  leads  as  a
determination of an internal content. We listen to musical pieces of which we know
every dynamic, we reread poems of which we know every syllable by heart, we look at
paintings of which we could reproduce every square millimeter – just as we reactivate
the same device to perform the same activity when we are gratified by performing it.
The “playful”  nature  of  the  aesthetic  lies  not  least  in  this  intrinsic  performativity,
which stands for the enactment of a meaningfulness that makes the meanings that are
recruited operative, as we have already seen with Dewey’s own words (LW.10: 277).
38 Therefore, the conception of the Extended Mind paradigm that (following Gallagher)
can be derived from Dewey’s approach is enactivist, not functionalist, as it has often
been instead the case,  since the by now canonical  proposal  of  Clark and Chalmers.
Functionalistically,  the  mind  “extends”  itself  because  some  of  its  functions  are
attributed to portions of the external world, i.e. to the scaffoldings or supports that we
find in the external world (as in the famous example of Inga and Otto’s notebook). From
an enactivist approach, instead, I would speak of extended mind as a specification of
what Dewey meant when he recalled exactly in Art as Experience that “mind is primarily
a verb” (LW.10: 258). Much debate on the notion of the mind starts from the neglect of
this  indication.  Considering  this  verbality  means  –  or  at  least  it  may  mean  –
emphasizing the modality rather than the substantiality of the mind. Mind is the mode
of operation that involves in its own field the expressive continuity that is a coupling of
organism and  environment  rather  than  a  substantial  entity  that  acts  on  body  and
world. In this sense, it is primitively (also) a relationship of meaningful correspondence
that is embodied in non-thematizing environmental explorations. Mind extends itself
in enacting a potential meaningfulness, thus to the same extent as it is aesthetically
operative. Consequently, the paradigm of the extended mind gets much more than a
merely  metaphorical  meaning,  given  its  ability  to  properly  describe  the  collusive
relationality onto which judicative and cognitive acts (i.e., acts of meaning) are grafted.
Therefore,  pursuing  the  description  of  what  happens  in  an  aesthetic experience  is
perhaps one of the most faithful and fruitful ways to keep proceeding on Dewey’s trail
today also far beyond aesthetics. 
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NOTES
1. Within the framework of a general agreement, what I aim at highlighting here are yet some
diverging elements of my perspective from Johnson’s that I have outlined in a book forum that
also  includes  Johnson’s  responses  and  counter-objections.  See  Johnson  et  al. 2020.  For  the
distinction I will use below between “experience-of” and “experience-with,” see Matteucci 2018
and 2019.
ABSTRACTS
This  papers  aims  at  showing  how  Dewey’s  legacy  can  contribute  to  better  understand  the
correlation  between  the  problem  of  meaning  and  the  description  of  the  aesthetic  in  the
framework of a specifically enactivist approach to the model of the extended mind. My thesis is
that Dewey’s characterization of this issue has a general theoretical import in that it makes it
inappropriate to speak of “aesthetic meanings,” or even of “meanings of the aesthetic.” It instead
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highlights the aesthetic character of meaning as such, that is, how an experiential phenomenon
can be meaningful insofar as it is characterized in an aesthetic sense. Accordingly, we will speak
here of “aesthetic meaningfulness.” To this extent, after a comparison between Dewey and Quine
about the “praxis of meaning,” a dialogue will be established with two recent perspectives openly
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